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THE NEW GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION LAW*
Ernest C. Steefelt and Bernhard von Falkenhausen:
In the first of two articles on the new German Stock Corporation Law, the
authors discuss the basic structure of the "Aktiengesellschaft" (AG), the
German equivalent of the American publicly owned business corporation.
They emphasize the impact of the new law on the AG, especially in relation
to its formation and the structure of its management. In addition, the




German law recognizes two kinds of business corporations, the Aktien-
gesellschaft (Stock Corporation-AG) and the Gesellschaft mit be-
schrinkter Haftung (Company with Limited Liability-GmbH). The
prototype of the AG in the United States is the publicly owned corpora-
tion, whereas the GmbH is comparable to the American close corporation.
Its corporate structure is more flexible and thus cheaper to manage than
that of an AG, it leaves the incorporators more discretion in the regulation
of the relative rights and duties of officers and shareholders, and it does
not require the publication of financial statements. Originally, the GmbH
was introduced into German law as a means for the incorporation of
small businesses. There is, however, no legal limitation as to size (as there
is, for example, in Switzerland).
The decision by a promoter as to whether he should incorporate in
the form of the AG or the GmbH is thus generally determined by his
needs for public financing. As long as the necessary capital can be received
without resort to the market, the GmbH will be preferred. The great
majority of German subsidiaries of American corporations are GmbHs.
The shares of a GmbH cannot be publicly traded, however, so if the
promoters contemplate offering shares of their corporation to the public,
they must use the legal form of an AG. From the standpoint of a prudent
investor who wants a market for his securities, the AG-share (Aktie) is
the only possible form of stock ownership in a German corporation.
* This is the first of two articles by the authors on the new German Stock Corporation
Law. In a future article they will explore the impact of the new law on "capital increases,"
mergers, "combined enterprises," and corporate finance.
t Doctor of Laws 1930, University of Heidelberg; Licencie en Driot 1934, University of
Paris; Diplome' d'Etudes Superieures 1935, University of Strasbourg. Dr. Steefel is engaged
in general and international practice. He is authorized to practice before the German courts
as Rechtsanwalt, and is a member of the New York and English Bars.
t LL.B. 1952, Cornell Law School. Board of Editors, Cornell Law Quarterly, 1951-1952.
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NEW GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION LAW
The AG was originally regulated in the German Commercial Code
(Handelsgesetzbucz-HGB). In 1937 it became the subject of a spe-
cial corporation statute, the Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Law).
After the Second World War and the emergence of a free market economy,
the A ktiengesetz of 1937 was criticized as favoring management to the
disadvantage of the shareholders. The soundness of this criticism was
debatable.' The question, however, became moot in 1965 with the enact-
ment of the new Aktiengesetz' (AktG), which became effective on
January 1, 1966. The new statute has the express purpose of making
corporate stock more attractive as an investment to the general public
and therefore endeavors to improve the shareholders' position.
Since the protection of shareholders largely depends on the effective-
ness of minority rights, the statute emphasizes the protection of minority
shareholders. It considerably increases the duties of management to
inform the shareholders,' it makes existing remedies more attractive
and less expensive, and it introduces some new remedies which had been
unknown in the old statute.4
The enactment of the new AktG by the legislature was preceded by a
careful study of foreign corporation laws. It is thus not surprising that
some of the new rules are clearly influenced by principles of American
corporation law and practice. For example, management is bound to help
opposing shareholders with the distribution of their proposals among
fellow-shareholders in a way similar to that under the "proposal rule"5
of the American Securities and Exchange Commission, dissenting share-
holders now enjoy appraisal rights in case of certain organic changes
in their corporation, 6 and corporations may distribute interim dividends.7
By and large, however, the new statute does not radically depart from
the established principles of German corporation law. Thus court deci-
1 For American lawyers this criticism is not very convincing, for the position of the
managerial officers in a German AG under the Aktiengesetz of 1937 was in many respects
weaker than that of their American colleagues. See, von Falkenhausen & Steefel, "Share-
holders' Rights in German Corporations (AG and GmbH)," 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 407
(1961). See also Vagts, "Book Review," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1046, 1050 (1962).
2 Aktiengesetz 1965 [hereinafter cited as AktG]. An English translation of the statute
is available. Aktiengesetz 1965: The German Stock Corporation Law (Mueller & Galbraith
transl. 1966). For German commentary on the new statute, see Obermiller, Werner & Winden,
Das Aktiengesetz 65 (1965); von Godin & Wilhelmi, Kommentar zum Aktien-Gesetz (2d ed.
1966).
See text accompanying notes 217-26 infra.
4 See, e.g., text accompanying note 210 infra.
5 SEC Rule X-14A-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1964); see text accompanying notes
196-202 infra.
6 See AktG §§ 320 (retiring shareholders' rights to "indemnity" upon "integration" into
another stock corporation) and 375 (dissenting shareholders' right to indemnity upon
"transformation" into GmbH).
7 See AktG § 59; Kropff, Textausgabe zum Aktiengesetz § 59, at 79 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Kropff].
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
sions rendered under the Aktiengesetz of 1937 or even under its pre-
decessor, the HGB, are in many instances still valid authorities for the
interpretation of the new statute. The same can be said with regard to old
textbooks and commentaries.
II
Tim FORMATION OF AN AG
An AG receives its corporate existence upon registration in the
Handelsregister (Commercial Register) at its domicile. The Register
is kept with the Amtsgericht, the lowest German court of original jurisdic-
tion. But before applying for registration, the promoters must complete
a number of "preincorporation" steps.
A. Articles of Association
The first step toward forming a corporation is the drafting of its
articles of association (Satzung) by the promoters. The articles of associ-
ation fulfill the functions of both the certificate of incorporation and the
bylaws of an American corporation. They spell out the prospective
activities of the corporation and the relative rights and duties of its
officers and shareholders. However, since statutes regulate these matters
in detail and the statutory provisions cannot, in general, be abrogated
by the articles of association,' the promoters have little discretion.
Section 23(3) of the AktG requires that the following matters be
clearly set forth in the articles:
(1) The name and domicile9 of the company.
(2) The subject of its business, in particular, the goods and products
which the company is to produce or trade in.Y0
(3) The amount of its legal capital (Grundkapital)J"
(4) The number of shares issued with the par value of each share,
8 AktG § 23(4).
9 The promoters may choose as domicile the place where the top administration of their
company is to be installed or any other place where the company is to operate a plant or
another business establishment. AktG § 5.
10 The subject of the corporation's business-as stated in the articles of association-does
not in any way limit the power of a German corporation. There is no ultra vires doctrine
in German law. The shareholders, in particular, have no right to enjoin their corporation
from doing acts which are outside of the scope of, or even prohibited by, the articles of
association. See, e.g., S. D. v. Gusstahlwerk, Reichsgericht (II Zivilsenat), Nov. 19, 1926,
115 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 246, 249 (1927). [Decisions of the
Reichsgericht in Civil Matters-hereinafter cited as RGZ] (the Reichsgericht was the
highest German court in civil and criminal cases until 1945). See also Eckert, "Shareholder
and Management: A Comparative View on Some Corporate Problems in the United States
and Germany," 46 Iowa L. Rev. 12, 13 n.5 (1960).
11 The "Grundkapital" of a German AG roughly corresponds to the legal or stated
capital of an American corporation. It is the aggregate par value of all the issued shares,
including treasury shares, of the corporation.
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and, if there are several classes of shares, the relative rights and
privileges of each class."2
(5) The number and qualifications of the members of the managing
board (Vorstand).
(6) The form in which notices and other announcements of the cor-
poration are to be communicated to the shareholders and the
public."4
The articles of association may have, and usually do have, additional
provisions which are permitted as long as they are in harmony with the
statutes. Such additional provisons may, for example, refer to the super-
visory board (Aufsichtsrat),1 the procedure to be followed at share-
holders' meetings,"0 restrictions in the transfer of shares, 7 or the duration
of the company's existence.
The articles of association must be executed before a court or a notar8
and be signed by at least five persons, 9 all of whom must have subscribed
to at least one share of the company. 0 The articles must also certify
.that all the shares of the company have been subscribed and spell out the
participation of each subscriber.2 '
B. Election and Appointment of the Initial Corporate Officers
After the corporate capital has been subscribed, the shareholders elect
the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat-SB) of the company, which in
12 See text accompanying notes 24-30 infra. AG shares are bearer shares, transferable by
delivery, unless the articles of association provide otherwise. AktG § 24(1). Shares issued
before they are fully paid must be registered. AktG § 10(2).
13 See text accompanying notes 64-111 infra.
14 See text accompanying notes 169-73 infra.
15 See text accompanying notes 112-45 infra.
16 See text accompanying notes 174-214 infra.
17 A corporation may, in its articles of association, restrict the transfer of its shares by
making such transfers subject to the approval of the corporation or one of its organs.
AktG § 68(2). Restrictions of this kind cannot be imposed on the transferability of bearer
shares, nor can they be adopted by amendment to the articles of association, unless they
are assented to by all the shareholders affected thereby. AktG § 180(2).
18 AktG § 23(1). The position of a German "notar" is not comparable with that of an
American notary public. A "notar" in Germany must be a lawyer. He usually acquires his
status only after years of practical experience as an attorney. His functions go much beyond
the authentication of signatures. Many of the more important business transactions like
the transfer of real property or the setting-up of a corporate charter are validly conducted
only when they are put into a written instrument drawn up by a "notar" or by a court.
The German "notar" is responsible for the validity of the documents executed in his office,
and he must give advice to parties regarding the legal effects of their transactions. See
Schlesinger, Comparative Law 12-13, 83-84 (2d ed. 1959).
19 The statutory minimum of five shareholders must be met at the time of the formation
of the AG only. Once the corporation is established its legal existence is not affected by a
decrease in the number of shareholders below five persons. Thus AGs can be, and fre-
quently are, founded with the assistance of four dummies who subscribe to one share of
stock each, under the express stipulation that they will transfer their shares to the fifth
incorporator immediately after the AG has acquired legal existence.
20 See AktG §§ 2, 23(2).
21 AktG § 23(2).
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turn appoints the board of managers (Vorstand-BM) *22 The election
of the members of the supervisory board must take place in the presence
of a notar or before a court.23
C. Subscription and Payment of the Corporate Capital
The legal institution of an "authorized capital," under which the
promoters of an American company may incorporate first and raise the
necessary working capital later, is not recognized in Germany. A German
AG will not be registered unless the promoters can show that the corporate
capital provided in the articles of association has been fully subscribed.2
The legal minimum capital of an AG is DM 100,000 (about $25,000).25
The shares must have a par value of at least DM 50 (about $12.50)*6
Par values above this sum must amount to at least DM 100 or a multiple
of DM 100.27 Shares without par value are not permitted.
At the time registration is sought, at least twenty-five per cent of the
par value of all shares exchanged for cash must be paid. If the shares were
issued at a price above their par value, the difference between the par
value and the subscription price must also be paid., The issue of shares
below their par value is prohibited °.2 No such down payment is required
with regard to shares issued for a consideration other than cash (e.g., real
property or machinery). The transfer of this kind of consideration to the
company can be delayed until after its registration. The articles of
association must, however, specify the kind of property, the amount of
shares to be issued in exchange therefor, and the name of the subscriber
concerned.80
D. The Promoters' Duty of Disclosure
The promoters must report to the BM and SB of their company the
steps they have taken with regard to the formation of the company.81
This "promoters' report" (Griindungsbericht) must be in writing and
must disclose all the facts and circumstances which are material in decid-
ing whether the consideration paid or promised for the shares has been
adequate. If shares have been issued in exchange for an existing business
22 AktG §§ 30, 31.
28 AktG § 30(1).
24 AktG § 29.
25 AktG § 7.
26 AktG § 8(1).
27 AktG § 8(2).
28 AktG § 36(2).
29 AktG § 9(1).
80 AktG § 27(1).
3' AktG § 32.
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enterprise, the report must, for example, state the net profits of the
business in its two preceding fiscal years.82 The promoters must also
disclose the profits derived in the course of the promotion. If they have
transferred property to the corporation in exchange for shares or for cash
which they acquired within two years preceding the promotion, they must
set forth their own costs of acquiring that property.3
The BM and SB must examine the correctness of the promoters'
report. They must, in particular, investigate whether the shares stated
in the articles of association have been fully subscribed and whether the
consideration paid and promised therefor has been adequate.3 4 In all
cases where shares have been issued for a consideration other than cash,
as well as in all cases where members of the BM or SB were personally
interested in the promotion of the company, the statute requires an addi-
tional examination by independent auditors.3 5 Both the BM and SB and
the auditors must set forth the results of their examinations in a written
report.3" Copies of the auditors' report are to be filed with the Commercial
Register and the local chamber of commerce. At both places the report
is open to inspection by any interested person."s
E. Registration of the Company
The application for registration of the company must be signed by all
the shareholders as well as by all the members of the BM and SB.38 The
application must set forth that the steps outlined above have been com-
pleted pursuant to the statute. Further, it must be proven that the down
payments for subscriptions have been made and are at the free disposition
of the BM.39 Together with the application, the following documents
must be submitted to the registration court:
(1) A copy of the articles of association.
(2) Copies of the documents referring to the election of the SB and
the appointment of the BM.
(3) A copy of the promoters' report as well as copies of the reports
regarding its examination by the BM and SB and by the auditors.
If there has been an examination by auditors, there must also
82 AktG § 32(2)3. The two-year period is calculated from the-date at which the articles of
association were executed. Fischer, in Grosskommentar zum Aktiengesetz (1937) § 24,
comment 3 (2d ed. 1961).
33 AktG § 32(2)2.
84 AktG § 34.
85 AktG § 33(2).
36 AktG § 34(2).
87 AktG § 34(3). See also Handelsgesetzbuch § 9 [German Commercial Code-hereinafter
cited at HGBI.
88 AktG § 36(1).
89 AktG § 37(1).
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be a confirmation of the chamber of commerce acknowledging
the receipt of this report."
The court may deny registration of a company when the application
does not comply with the above-described formalities. Furthermore, it
can reject an application when it is convinced that the statements by the
promoters or by the BM and SB of the company are untrue or incom-
plete, or when, in its opinion, the property which the company is to
receive in exchange for shares or for cash has been grossly over-valued.41
F. Pre-Incorporation Agreements
As a general rule, contracts made in behalf of the company before its
registration must be set forth in its articles of association. The theory is
that prospective creditors and shareholders of a newly formed corpora-
tion should have an opportunity to inform themselves as to whether and
to what extent the corporate property is encumbered by such "precon-
ceived" obligations. This rule applies with particular force to contracts
binding the company to grant special privileges to some of its share-
holders or to pay for services rendered in the process of its incorporation
or the purchase of property of any kind.4" Contracts of this kind which
are not included in the articles of association are void as to the company
and cannot be ratified by it even after its registration.43 Other contracts
(e.g., employment contracts) which are not included in the articles of
association will not bind the company unless they are assumed by it after
registration.
The above rule probably does not apply to contracts necessary for
carrying on the corporate business (if there had been a corporate business
before the company was registered)." The scope of this exception, how-
ever, is not clear. It is thus advisable for the promoters to include any
contracts which the company is expected to make before its registration
in the articles of association. Contracts which, according to these prin-
ciples, do not bind the company may be enforced against the persons who
acted in its behalf.45 In this respect the German law is comparable to the
usual American rules for promoters' liability on pre-incorporation agree-
ments.
G. Liability of Persons Responsible for the Formation of an AG
The statute imposes a strict duty of good faith and due care on all
persons connected with the formation of an AG, such as the promoters,
40 AktG § 37(2).
41 AktG § 38(2).
42 AktG §§ 26, 27.
43 AktG §§ 26(3), 41(3).
44 Fischer, supra note 32, § 24, comment 28.
45 AktG § 41(1).
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the members of the BM and SB, and other persons acting on their behalf.
For example, if a company has been damaged by incorrect or incomplete
statements in its application for registration, or in its accompanying
reports, the promoters are jointly liable unless they can prove that they
used the care of prudent businessmen. The same liability exists in cases
where the company has been damaged by business transactions prior
to its incorporation which were grossly unfair to it.4" Furthermore, pro-
moters under certain circumstances, must answer for the obligations of
their fellow-promoters. If, for example, a promoter turns out to be insol-
vent and unable to pay his subscription price, the other promoters must
assume the loss if they knew of his financial irresponsibility at the time
they accepted his subscription." These rules apply not only to promoters
but also to those persons on whose behalf and under whose direction the
shares were subscribed by the promoters.48 Thus the promoters' liability
cannot be evaded by using a financially irresponsible dummy. The same
liability applies to all persons who have improperly enriched themselves
in the process of incorporation. 4 In addition, the BM and SB owe to their
company diligence and efficiency, not only after it has been formed, but
also during the process of its formation."0
The above claims against the promoters, the members of the manage-
ment, and other persons connected with the incorporation belong to the
company and not to the individual shareholders. 1 Individual shareholders
or creditors may, however, have separate causes of action in tort if they
were induced to deal with the corporation by false pretenses.
8 2
H. Liability of Shareholders on Their Subscriptions
It has been pointed out that subscriptions for shares against cash must
have been paid up to at least twenty-five per cent when the corporation
is registered. After the company has been formed, it is the duty of the
BM to call in unpaid subscriptions. 8 Shareholders who fail to pay their
assessments forfeit their membership rights. 4 It should be noted that the
only defenses available to shareholders in an action for the subscription
price are insanity and minority. In order to protect corporate creditors,
courts generally exclude the application of the ordinary rules applying
46 AktG § 46.
47 AktG § 46(4).
48 AktG § 46(g).
49 AktG § 47.
50 AktG § 48; see text accompanying notes 101-04, 140-41 infra.
51 For the rights of individual shareholders to compel the enforcement of such a
corporate claim, see text accompanying notes 227-34 infra.
52 Bhirgerliches Gesetzbuch § 826 [German Civil Code-hereinafter cited as BGB].
53 AktG § 63(1).
54 AktG § 64(3).
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to the rescission of contracts. Shareholders thus will not be heard when
they contend that their subscriptions had been obtained by fraud, duress,
or some other kind of improper dealing.5 5 The law further specifies that
the company may not waive its claims for unpaid subscriptions nor permit
them to be set off against debts owed by it to the shareholders concerned.56
I. Foreign Aspects
An AG must have its domicile in Germany.57 This, in turn, necessitates
that the company have either a plant or another kind of permanent estab-
lishment, its head office, or its top management in Germany.5" But there
is no restriction upon the nationality of promoters and shareholders. Thus
foreign individuals and corporations can establish an AG or acquire its
shares on the same footing as German citizens.
Foreign corporations not domiciled in one of the member states of
the European Economic Community need a license for doing business
in Germany.59 Owning or acquiring stock in a German corporation (even
if it is 100 per cent), however, does not by itself amount to doing
business in Germany.6
'II
THE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE OF AN AG
A board of directors in the British and American sense, that is, a body
which directs the affairs of a corporation and consists of both top man-
agers as well as persons with consulting and supervisory functions only, is
unknown in Germany. The Aktiengesetz, following the old tradition of
German corporation law, divides the functions of the board of direc-
tors between the board of management (BM) and the supervisory board
(SB) .6 The power to manage the business of an AG and to represent
it, in and out of court, in its dealings with third parties is exclusively
vested in the BM. The functions of the SB are, as the name indicates,
restricted to the supervision of the BM. The supervisory board, or
at least the majority of its members, are in turn dependent on the
65 Baumbach & Hueck, Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (1937) § 16, comment 1 (10th ed.
1961) [hereinafter cited as Baumbach & Hueck]; Neuergasthoff GmbH v. K., Reichsgericht
(II Zivilsenat), Dec. 14, 1928, 123 RGZ 102, reprinted in part in Schlesinger, supra note
18, at 301-05; von Falkenhausen & Steefel, "Shareholders, Rights in German Corporations
(AG and GmbH)," 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 407, 425 (1961).
56 AktG § 66(1).
57 Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut in Grosskommentar zum Aktiengesetz § 5, comment 2a
(2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut].
58 AktG § 5(2).
59 Gewerbeordrung § 12 (1869) (Trade Law).
60 Harvard University Law School, International Program in Taxation, Taxation in the
Federal Republic of Germany 595 (1963).
61 The term "Direktor" always designates, contrary to the American practice, a person
who holds a leading managerial position. He may, but need not, belong to the BM.
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shareholders, who usually act through resolutions passed at the share-
holders' meeting (Hauptversammlung). Members of the BM may not
simultaneously sit in the SB and vice versa.62 The supervisory board
may appoint one or more of its members to the BM if necessary to fill
a vacancy there. However, such appointment may not last longer than
one year.63 Though members of the BM and the SB are usually share-
holders of their corporation, this is not required.
A. The Board of Management
(1) Internal Organization. The board of management normally may
consist of one person only. But corporations with a stated capital of
more than DM 3 million ($750,000) must have a BM of at least 2
persons, unless the articles of association provide otherwise.6 4 Larger
corporations usually have a BM of three or more persons. The internal
organization of the BM is regulated, at least in the larger corporations,
in its rules of business (Gesckdftsordnung). These rules usually spell
out the functions of the individual members of the BM and the depart-
ments of which they are in charge (e.g., finance, production, or sale).
If the articles of association do not provide otherwise, the primary
responsibility for the construction of such rules is with the SB. As long
as the SB does not act in this matter, the members of the BM may, by
unanimous vote, establish their own rules of business. 65
Resolutions of the BM must be adopted unanimously, unless the
articles of association or the rules of business of the BM provide for a
majority vote. 6 They may also provide for the creation of the office of
chairman. If they do, the chairman is appointed and removed by the
SB.67 Under the old statute the chairman of the BM held the position of
general manager. He ran the company and was the superior of all its
employees, including his colleagues in the BM. Under the new Aktien-
gesetz, the articles of association may still provide that the chairman's
vote may break a tie;6" however, they may not provide that he can
disregard a majority decision of his colleagues6 9
(2) Appointment and Removal. The members of the BM are appointed
by the SB for a maximum period of five years.7° This appointment can
62 AktG § 105(1).
68 AktG § 105(2).
64 AktG § 76(2).
65 AktG § 77(2).
66 AktG § 77(1).
67 AktG §§ 84(2)-(3).
68 Kropff § 77, at 99; Obermiiller, Werner & Winden, 1 Aktiengesetz 1965, at 42 (1965).
69 AktG § 77(1).
70 AktG § 84(1).
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be renewed for unlimited, successive five-year periods.1 The articles of
association of most large corporations, however, have a mandatory retire-
ment clause for BM members, effective after they have reached their sixty-
fifth birthday.
The SB may remove a BM member before the expiration of his five-
year term only for cause. 2 Thus the position of the BM member is
more secure in some ways than his counterpart, the American corporate
officer, who is usually removable with or without cause by the board
of directors. 3 For the BM member, sufficient cause exists, for example,
in cases of incapacity, incompetence, or gross violation of his duties
toward the corporation. Furthermore, the SB may remove a BM member
for cause in case of a vote of no confidence at the shareholders' meeting.
Such a vote empowers, but does not compel, the SB to remove the BM
member concerned. The SB must disregard the vote of no confidence if
the reasons behind it are obviously arbitrary.
The tenure of a person as BM member must be distinguished from his
employment contract with the corporation, a distinction which is made
by American law in regard to corporate officers. 4 Employment contracts
with BM members may not be concluded for a longer period than five
years. Renewals for additional five-year periods are possible and cus-
tomary. According to a wide-spread corporate practice, BM members
whose terms have been repeatedly renewed are granted pension rights.
Removal of a BM member from his position for cause does not auto-
matically terminate his rights under the employment contract. The re-
quirements for the cancellation of an employment contract are stricter
than those for the removal from a BM position. If a BM member has
been removed for reasons concerning which he is not personally at fault
(e.g., long illness), or if he is guilty only of a minor infraction of his
duties, he may still retain his rights to compensation for the unexpired
term of his office and to a pension.75
(3) Authority of the BM To Bind the Corporation. The power of the
BM to represent the corporation is practically unlimited. Unlike many
American corporation laws, the Aktiengesetz has no provision making the
validity of certain transactions, such as the execution of mortgages and
71 Ibid.72 AktG § 84(3).
73 See, e.g., ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 45 (1960); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 716
(McKinney 1963) (applicable to stock corporations, Sept. 1, 1967).
74 See, e.g., United Producers & Consumers Co-op. v. Held, 225 F.2d 615 (9th Cir.
1955); ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 45 (1960).
75 See the decision of the Bundesgerichtshof [highest German court in civil and criminal
matters after the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany-hereinafter cited as
BGH] in [1966] Wertpapiermitteilungen 968; Baumbach & Hueck § 75, comment 6A;
Meyer-Landrut in Grosskommentar zum Aktiengesetz § 75, comment 16 (2d ed. 1961).
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guarantees, subject to shareholder approval. There is only one exception:
The so-called "enterprise contract" (Unternehmensvertrag), by which a
corporation, in effect, renounces its independence and submits itself to
the domination of another enterprise, must be approved by seventy-five
per cent of the share capital represented at a shareholders' meeting.7'
Another limitation on the authority of the BM applies to transactions
between the corporation and individual BM members. In such transac-
tions, as well as in civil litigation between BM members and their cor-
poration, the latter can be represented only by its SB. 7
The authority of the BM to represent the corporation cannot be
restricted in the articles of association. In particular, this authority is
not limited by the statement of the purpose of a corporate enterprise
in the articles of association, or by the scope of the corporate business.
The BM may bind the corporation to contracts which have nothing to
do with the corporate business. In other words, there is no ultra vires
doctrine in German law."8 Furthermore, shareholders may not restrict
the authority of the managing board by providing in the articles of as-
sociation that certain transactions require the consent of the SB or
shareholders. Provisions in the articles of association which make business
transactions of the BM subject to an approval of the shareholders are
invalid. 9 Such questions can be passed upon by the shareholders' meeting
only if the board expressly so requests.80 The articles of association may,
and usually do, provide that transactions of a certain magnitude (like the
grant of powers of "procuration"8 1 or the grant or the acceptance of
loans beyond a certain sum) should be executed only with the approval of
the SB. Restrictions of this kind are valid. 2 They bind the BM, however,
only with regard to the corporation, and they are unenforceable against
third persons. 3
If the BM consists of more than one person, it must act jointly in
76 AktG § 293(1).
77 AktG § 112. This limitation was introduced into German corporate law by the
Aktiengesetz of 1965. Under the old rule, which still applies to GmbHs, the BM could
represent its corporation with regard to contracts and civil proceedings with BM members.
See, e.g., Kropff § 112; von Falkenhausen & Steefel, supra note 55, at 416.
78 See note 10 supra.
79 Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 103, comment 4.
80 AktG § 119(2).
81 The power of procuration (Prokura) is a very broad authority created by the
German Commercial Code. In effect, the holder of a power of procuration can perform
any kind of legal act, binding on his principal, as long as he does not transfer or encumber
real property or sell the principal's business as a whole; see HGB § 49.
82 AktG § 82(2).
83 This is true even in cases where the other party knew of the restrictions, unless the
corporation can prove that the BM member and the other party to the contract were
guilty of collusion with intent to damage the corporation. Schmidt & Meyer-Landurt § 74,
comment 12; Eckert, "Shareholder and Management: A Comparative View on Some
Corporate Problems in the United States and Germany," 46 Iowa L. Rev. 12, 18-19 (1960).
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order to bind the corporation. 4 The articles of association may, and
normally do, delegate this authority by providing that the corporation
may be represented by one or two members of the BM, or by one BM
member together with a holder of procuration. 5 The BM, in turn, may
appoint agents and determine their authority.
(4) Duties of BM Members to the Corporation. Members of the BM
owe their corporation obedience, loyalty, and care, in different degrees.8
(a) The Duty of Obedience. Least developed of the three duties is
that of obedience. The statute requires the BM to run the corporate
business according to its own independent judgment." Neither the SB nor
the shareholders can give BM members binding directions in matters of
business management.8 The BM may, however, submit management
questions at the shareholders' meeting and request a ruling.89 In such
case (and only in such case) a shareholders' resolution relating to man-
agement questions is binding on the BM.90 Some commentators contend
that business transactions which basically affect the corporate business
and involve special risks must always be submitted by the BM to the
shareholders' meeting.9' Whether the BM is legally required to do this is
an open question. But apart from legal necessity, such a procedure is
often good business policy, and since a BM member cannot be held re-
sponsible for the consequences of business transactions which have been
submitted to and approved at the shareholders' meeting,92 the procedure
will often protect the BM members themselves.93
Apart from the above, the BM's duty of obedience exists only with
regard to the articles of association and the rules of business of the BM
and the SB.94 These documents may internally restrict the management
power of the BM by requiring SB approval for the more important
business transactions.9 5 As has been pointed out, restrictions of this kind
84 AktG-§ 78(2).
85 AktG § 78(3).
86 Rough comparison may be made to the duties owed by corporate managers in most
American jurisdictions; that is, the duty to act intra vires and within authority, the
various fiduciary duties, and the duty of due care.
87 AktG § 76(1).
88 Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 70, comments 7-8.
89 AktG § 119(2).
90 Kropff § 118, at 165.
91 Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 103, comment 4.
92 AktG § 93(4).
93 Compare the American law of "shareholder ratification or approval." Gottlieb v.
Hleyden Chemical Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 177, 91 A.2d 57 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Eisen v. Post 3
N.Y.2d 518, 146 N.E.2d 779, 169 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1957).
94 AktG § 82(2).
95 AktG § 111(4). Restrictions of this kind may not go so far as to make independent
management by the BM impossible. They are invalid if they impede the discretion of BM
members with regard to ordinary management questions. Baumbach & Hueck § 95,
comment 7; Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 95, comment 20.
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cannot be enforced against third personsY6 Nevertheless, they are an
effective means for control and supervision, since BM members who
disregard them can be instantly removed for cause.
(b) The Duty of Loyalty. BM members must devote all their time and
energy to the corporate business. They may not, without the consent of
the SB, run a business of their own or occupy a leading position in the
management of another business.97 Whether. the other business is in
competition with the corporation is immaterial. Furthermore, the consent
of the SB is required for any business transaction which BM members
conclude in the corporate line of business for their own accounts. BM
members who disregard this rule are liable to the corporation in damages.
However, instead of suing for damages, the corporation may consider the
business transaction as having been made for its benefit and, conse-
quently, claim the proceeds thereof.9 This is similar to the results reached
by American courts under the doctrine of "usurpation of corporate op-
portunity.2)99
By and large, the fiduciary duty of BM members falls short of the
standards set in American case law and statutes. For example, German
law does not compel corporate executives to account for profits obtained
through self-dealing, insider trading, or the sale of control. Transactions
of this kind are actionable by the corporation only in case of fraud. 100
(c) The Duty of Diligence and Care. The members of the BM must
fulfill their management functions with due care, and they are jointly
and severally liable to the corporation for any damage resulting from
violations of these duties. In cases of doubt, the BM member concerned
has the burden of proving that he, in the particular case, acted with the
necessary care.' The standard which he must meet is determined by the
competence and diligence of an average prudent business manager in a
comparable position.' 2 It is an objective standard and does not take
into account the individual competence of a BM member. Unlike some
American authorities, the German courts universally reject defenses
brought on subjective grounds like unfitness or inexperience.' 0 3 A person
who accepts a position in the BM of a German corporation in effect
warrants that he possesses the knowledge and skill required to run the'
business of the corporation concerned.0 "
96 See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
97 AktG § 88(1).
98 AktG § 88(2).
99 See Henn, Corporations and Other Business Enterprises § 238 (1961).
100 See Eckert, supra note 83, at 58-59.
101 AktG § 93(2).
102 AktG § 93(1).
103 See Eckert, supra note 83, at 39.
104 See Schilling, in Grosskommentar zum Aktiengesetz § 84, comment 9 (2d ed. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as Schilling].
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In practice there are only rare instances where a BM member has been
held liable in damages for negligent mismanagement. The reason for
this is probably economic necessity. Corporate management, like every
kind of business management, includes the necessity of taking risks.
If a corporation is to be run profitably, its managers must be permitted
to take risks without the danger of personal liability whenever things
go wrong. Thus German courts and commentators grant corporate man-
agers a wide range of discretion in their choice of means and methods.
Even though something like the American "business judgment" rule
has never been expressly recognized in Germany, the practical result
is more or less the same as if such a rule existed.
(5) Compensation of BM Members. The compensation of BM mem-
bers usually consists of a fixed salary, a share in the corporate profits,
and, after a certain length of service, pension rights for themselves and
their dependents. The compensation is determined by the SB. There are
no fixed standards for the adequacy of executive compensation. The old
statute of 1937 expressly provided that corporations which granted
members of their management boards a share in profits had to make
adequate contributions for the benefit of their employees or for charitable
purposes.i0 Although the primary responsibility for compliance with
this rule rested in the SB, the district attorney at the domicile of the
corporation was also empowered to bring a special action for its enforce-
ment. This legislative attempt to make executive profit sharing dependent
on corresponding donations for social or charitable purposes was not
successful. Lacking definite standards for the determination of a "reason-
able relationship" between these two items, the rule proved to be unwork-
able and was rarely invoked.
The new Aktiengesetz has no such provisions. It merely provides that
a reasonable relationship must exist between the amount of compensation
which a BM member receives and his functions and duties within the
corporate hierarchy.0 6 This rule does not limit the authority of the BM
to employ BM members and to fix their compensation, although the grant
of excessive compensation in an employment contract may make the
responsible SB members liable to the corporation in damages. The
contract itself, however, is binding on the corporation." 7
The SB may reduce the compensation of BM members whenever the
economic situation of the company seriously deteriorates. It makes no
difference whether the compensation was adequate or excessive at the
105 AktG 37 § 77(3).
106 AktG § 87(1).
107 Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 74, comment 5.
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time the employment contract was executed. However, such reduction may
take place only in exceptional circumstances, where the financial distress
is so serious that payment of the agreed compensation would be gravely
inequitable to the corporation. 08 The BM members affected by such
reduction may in turn leave the corporation, with six weeks' notice, as
of the end of the next calendar quarter-year.
Executive compensation is not as openly discussed in Germany as it is
in the United States. The annual report of the corporation must state the
aggregate amount of compensation paid to all the BM members during
the fiscal year.0 9 The compensation of an individual member, however,
has generally been considered to be a private matter which neither the
public nor the shareholders have a right to know."0 Thus the recent
decision by a lower court which ordered a corporation to disclose to the
shareholders the contents of a pension contract with a former BM
member"' has caused considerable surprise in -the corporate world. This
decision has been appealed by the corporation, so whether it will stand
as authority remains to be seen.
B. The Supervisory Board
(1) Internal Organization. The SB consists of three members or of a
multiple thereof." 2 Under the old statute there was, in effect, no limita-
tion as to the number of SB positions an individual could hold. However,
the new Aktiengesetz drastically limits the number which a person may
legally accept. No person may be an SB member of more than ten cor-
porations."' Two other groups of persons are disqualified from serving
on the SB of a corporation: (a) persons who are "legal representatives"" 4
of a subsidiary of the corporation concerned" 5 and (b) persons who are
legal representatives of another corporation, in .the SB of which is already
a member of the BM of the corporation concerned."'
108 AktG § 87(2).
109 AktG § 160(3)8. Under the old statute this figure included the pension payments
made to former BM members or their dependents. Now pension payments must be listed
as a separate item. AktG § 160(3)9.
11o Deuss, Das Auskunftsrect des Aktiongis 90 (1962); Obermiiller, Werner & Winden,
supra note 68, at 89.
111 Decision of the Landgericht in Mainz, July 1, 1966, published in 11 Die Aktiengesell-
shaft [hereinafter cited as Die AG] 327 (1966).
112 AktG § 95.
113 AktG § 100(2)1. There is an exception for subsidiaries. Persons who are "legal
representatives" of business enterprises, i.e., BM members of a corporation, general partners
of a partnership, or proprietors of a business, may serve in the Sls of up to five subsidiaries
of their enterprises in addition to their quota of ten SB mandates. AktG § 100(2).
114 See note 113 supra for a definition of "legal representative."
115 AktG § 100(2)2.
116 AktG § 100(2)3. If, for example, A is a member of the BM of X corporation and a
member of the SB of Y corporation, the members of the BM of Y corporation are disquali-
fied from serving in the SB of X. The theory behind this rule is that a person cannot dis-




The SB members elect their own chairman and deputy chairman." '
The chairman usually presides not only at the SB meetings but also at
the annual meeting of the shareholders' 1 SB meetings must take place
at least once in each calendar half-year," 9 and the chairman is also
required to call additional meetings whenever one SB member so re-
quests. 20 The members of the BM are entitled to attend the SB meet-
ings,12 and they nearly always do.
Contrary to traditional American practice, SB resolutions need not
be adopted at a meeting. They may be passed in writing, by telegraph, or
by telephone as long as none of the SB members objects to this proce-
dure.12 2 Resolutions of this kind are very common and, in many corpora-
tions, outnumber those passed at a meeting. Resolutions of the SB are
adopted by a majority vote of the SB members participating.'23
The SB may organize its members into one or more committees. But
the more important questions, such as the appointment and removal of
BM members, cannot be left to a committee and must be decided by all
the SB members.'24
(2) Appointment and Removal of SB Members. Except for the labor
representatives, the members of the SB are, in principle, elected at the
shareholders' meeting. 25 The election is governed by the straight-line
voting system; fifty-one per cent of the votes cast may elect all the
shareholders' representatives in the SB. The Aktiengesetz does not men-
tion the possibility of cumulative voting, and according to the weight of
authority, it cannot be provided for in the articles of association'
2 6
However, the articles of association may give certain shareholders (or
shareholders of a certain class of shares) a special right to appoint up to
one-third of the shareholders' representatives in the SB.'2
SB members may not be elected or appointed for a period longer than
four years. 28 Renewals are both possible and customary. Even before
the expiration of his term, an SB member elected by the shareholders
117 AktG § 107(1).
118 See text acompanying notes 174-75 infra.
119 AktG § 110(3).
120 AktG § 110(1).
121 AktG § 109(1).
122 AktG § 108(4). For a catalogue of jurisdictions in the United States which have
adopted a similar practice, see Henn, supra note 99, at 339 n.5.
123 Baumbach & Hueck § 92, comment 3B; Eckert, supra note 83, at 26; Schmidt &
Meyer-Landrut § 92, comment 16.
124 AktG § 107(3). Baumbach & Hueck § 87, comment 2; Kropff § 107, to 148; Schmidt
& Meyer-Landrut § 113, comment 11.
125 AktG § 101(1).
126 See Janberg, "Aufsichtsratsausschiisse nach altem und neuem Aktienrecht," 11 Die
AG 1 (1966).
127 AktG § 101(2).
123 AktG § 102(1).
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may be removed by this body with or without cause. The statute provides
for a vote of at least seventy-five per cent of the shares represented at
the meeting. This percentage can be increased or decreased (down to a
simple majority) in the articles of association. 29 A minority delegate may
be removed at the pleasure of the shareholders who appointed him."'3
The SB has no right to appoint or remove any of its members. Such a
right may not even be conferred by the articles of association. By a
majority vote of its members, however, the SB may apply for a court
order removing one or more members for cause. Removal proceedings
of this kind can be brought against any SB member, whether he has been
elected at the shareholders' meeting, by a group of shareholders, or by
the employees of the corporation. Additionally, shareholders owning ten
per cent or more of the stated capital of the corporation may initiate
removal proceedings for cause against SB members appointed by a group
of shareholders.' 3 '
(3) Powers and Functions of tke SB. The SB is not permitted to
participate actively in the management of the corporation.132 Its two
main functions are the appointment and removal of BM members 3 and
the supervision of the BM.'
The duty of the SB to supervise the activities of the BM corresponds
to the duty of the BM to supply the SB with complete and correct
information. In particular, the BM must regularly report on projected
business policies and the economic situation of the corporation, as well
as on the more important business transactions both before and after
their execution.3 5 The SB, in discharging its supervisory duties, need
not depend on the proffered reports of the BM. It may demand additional
reports at any time. This right need not be exercised by the SB as a body,
and even individual SB members may ask the BM for additional reports
to the SB. The BM must obey such requests if the demand by the SB
member is supported by one or more of his colleagues.' 0
The reports of the BM to the SB are open to inspection by every mem-
ber of the SB. Contrary to the American practice, however, individual SB
members have no right to inspect the corporate books and records.'37
This right exists only in favor of the SB as a body. Additionally, the SB
129 AktG § 103(1).
130 AktG § 103(2).
'3' AktG § 103(3).
132 AktG § 111(4).
183 See text accompanying notes 70-75 supra.
134 AktG § 111(1).
185 AktG §§ 90(1)-(2).
136 AktG § 90(3).
18 Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 9S, comment 10.
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may inspect the assets of the corporation, in particular its cash position
and its inventory of merchandise and securities. 3 ' The SB may delegate
this right to one or more of its members or may conduct investigations
through independent experts.139
The standard of care which SB members owe the corporation is similar
to that owed by BM members. 4 ° SB members must act with the same
diligence which the average prudent businessman in the position of an
SB member would employ.141 As in the case of BM members, an SB
member accused of negligence has the burden of proving that he used
the required skill and care. But, again as in the case of BM members,
there are only rare cases in which an SB member has been held per-
sonally liable to his corporation for negligent violations of his duties.
(4) Compensation of SB Members. SB members have no right to com-
pensation for their services, unless compensation is expressly provided
for in the articles of association or granted at a shareholders' meeting.142
The German law in this respect closely parallels the usual American rule
that directors are expected to attend to corporate affairs without compen-
sation absent a valid prearrangement with the corporation. 4 ' Neither
the SB nor the BM is empowered to provide compensation for SB mem-
bers.144 In practice, corporations do grant the SB members compensation,
consisting usually of a fixed fee and a share in the corporate profits.
The statute does not set up definite standards for determining the
proper amount of compensation to SB members. It merely provides that
the amount of compensation must be reasonably adjusted to the duties
of the particular SB member and to the financial situation of the cor-
poration.145 The amount of the compensation is always within the control
of the shareholders' meeting. If compensation is fixed in the articles of
association, the shareholders may, by simple majority, vote to amend the
articles and reduce the compensation provided therein.
138 AktG § 111(2).
139 Additional duties of the SB are: (1) to call special shareholders' meetings whenever
it considers this to be necessary for the welfare of the corporation (AktG § 111(3)) ; (2) to
examine the annual financial statements of the corporation, i.e. its balance sheet and
profit-and-loss statement, and the management's report (AktG §§ 170, 171); and (3) to
represent the corporation in its dealings, in and out of court, with the members of its BM
(AktG § 112).
140 AktG § 116.
141 Baumbach & Hueck § 99, comment; Schilling § 99, comment 1.
142 AktG § 113(1).
143 See Lofland v. Cahall, 13 Del. Ch. 384, 118 Atl. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Henn, Corpora-
tions and Other Business Enterprises § 244 (1961) ; 1 Washington & Rothschild, Compensating
the Corporate Executive 203-04 (3d ed. 1962).
144 This rule applies only to the compensation which SB members receive in this
capacity. SB members giving their corporation additional services (like legal or financial
advice) are entitled to the compensation usually paid for services of this kind, and the
BM may validly make contracts in this respect. However, such contracts are binding on
the corporation only after they have been approved by the SB (AktG § 114).
145 AktG § 113(1).
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C. Participation of Labor in the Management of an AG
The principle of co-determination (Mitbestimmung) was introduced
into German law in the early 1950's. Before that time, all the members
of the SB were elected or appointed by the shareholders. Now this is
true only as to so-called "family corporations," whose shares are ex-
clusively held by one natural person or the members of the same family,
and which have fewer than 500 employees. 1 6 In addition, no labor repre-
sentation is required in the admittedly rare case where a corporation
has fewer than five employees.
In other corporations one-third of the SB members must consist of
labor representatives 4 ' who are elected by the employees of the corpora-
tion.148 If the SB has only one or two labor representatives, they must
all be in the employment of the corporation. In bigger corporations with
more than two labor representatives in the SB, at least two of them must
be corporate employees. Employees with managerial functions (Leitende
Angestellte) are disqualified from serving as labor representatives in
the SB. 49
The labor representation is even greater in the SBs of corporations
with more than 1,000 employees which are engaged in coal mining or
iron and steel production. The SBs of such corporations consist of an
equal number of shareholder and labor representatives, and one "addi-
tional member" mutually agreed upon by the two groups. If the share-
holder and labor representatives cannot agree upon a mutually accep-
table person, the additional member is elected by the shareholders'
meeting. Thus the shareholders may still have a slight majority in the
SB.150 The SB must have at least 11 members. Companies with a stated
capital of DM 20 million or more may provide, in their articles of asso-
ciation, for an SB of fifteen persons; companies with a stated capital
of DM 50 million or more may provide for an SB of twenty-one members.
The employees designate only part of their representatives, while others
are appointed by the labor unions representing employees of the company.
Only a minority of .the labor representatives must be employees of the
corporation. It is customary for big corporations in the coal or iron and
146 Betriebsverfassungsgesetz § 76(6) (Oct. 11, 1952) (Enterprise Constitution Law)
[hereinafter cited as BVG].
147 BVG § 76(1).
148 BVG § 76(2).
149 BVG § 4(2)c. The question as to whether a certain employee does exercise
managerial functions is often rather complicated. For a collection of applicable court
decisions, see Haberkorn, "Knnen Leitende Angestellte in den Aufsichtsrat gewihlt
werden?" 9 Die AG 231 (1964).
150 For general discussions of the problems of co-determination, see Baumbach & Hueck,
at 303; Hueck, Gesellschaftsrecht 136 (1954); Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 86, comments
4(a)-(c) ; Eckert, "Shareholders and Management: A Comparative View on Some Corporate
Problems in the United States and Germany," 46 Iowa L. Rev. 12, 25-26 (1960).
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steel industries to have at least one professional labor leader in the SB,
who often acts as one of the deputy chairmen. Since the SB usually
reaches its decisions by a majority vote of its members,'51 the additional
member (the 11th, 15th or 21st man, as the case may be) has the key
position.
Labor representatives in the SB can be removed without cause at any
time by the body which designated them. Further, they can be removed
for cause by a court order, upon application by the SB. The decision
as to whether such an application should be filed is taken by simple
majority vote of the SB members.'52 Thus the shareholder representatives
may possibly compel the removal of labor members who, by grave mis-
conduct, have become unbearable for their corporation, even though this
removal is contrary -to the will of their electorate and their colleagues
in the SB.' 55 Employees who are members of the SB do not, however,
automatically lose their positions on the supervisory board with their
dismissal (even for cause) from the services of the corporation, as long
as the SB of the corporation still has the legally required number of
corporate employees. 54
Labor representatives in the SB have, in principle, the same rights and
duties as the SB members elected or appointed by the shareholders. They
receive the same compensation and are bound by the same duties of
diligence and loyalty. They thus may become personally liable if they
put the interests of their electorate, or of their union, above those of -the
company.'55 The question as to whether and to what extent a labor SB
member may participate in a strike without violating his duties is not
yet finally determined. According to the weight of authority a labor SB
member may safely quit work in case of a "legal strike" (i.e., a strike
called by the competent labor union in conformity with the statutory
procedure of labor negotiations). However, he probably may not actively
participate in the preparation or organization of such a strike. Any par-
ticipation in a wild-cat strike is, in any event, not consistent with his
duties as an SB member.'56
The company may not in any way impede the work of an employee
representative in the SB. It must give him the necessary time for the
'51 Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 86, comment 4(b).
152 AktG § 103(3).
153 See Kropff § 103, at 142.
154 See Judgment of the BGH, Feb. 21, 1963, reported in 8 Die AG 245 (1963). See
also Leo, "Die Fristlose Entlassung eines Arbeitnehmervertreters in Aufsichtsrat," 8 Die AG
234 (1963).
155 Baumbach & Hueck § 86, comment 7(A); Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 86, comment
4(d).
156 See Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 86, comment 4(d).
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discharge of his duties without loss of pay. 57 On the other hand, labor
representatives have no privileges in comparison with other SB members.
They have, in particular, no right to sit in a certain committee. 5 s
As to companies engaged in coal mining and iron and steel production
with more than 1,000 employees, labor representation is required not
only in the SB but also in the BM. The BM of such companies must have
one member in charge of personnel and social affairs (Arbeitsdirektor),
whose appointment and removal require the consent of the majority of
the labor representatives in the SB.' 59
D. The Shareholders' Meeting
(1) Powers and Functions. The most important function of the share-
holders' meeting, as in American law, is the appointment and removal
of the shareholders' representatives in the SB. 60 Other matters covered
at the shareholders' meeting are: (a) the declaration of dividends,
(b) the annual decision as to whether the SB and BM should be given
a vote of confidence (Entlastung), 161 (c) the amendment of the articles
of association, 6 and (d) the appointment of auditors for the preparation
of the annual report or for a special investigation. Questions of business
management are outside the jurisdiction of the shareholders' meeting
and may be decided by it only upon the special request of the BM. 6 3
There are both regular and special shareholders' meetings. Regular
meetings take place once a year. The agenda of a regular meeting is
normally within the discretion of the BM. Two items are, however, a
"must" on the agenda of a regular meeting-the disposition of the final
profit (Bilanzgewinn) of the financial year concerned, '6  and the vote
of confidence (or denial of such vote) for the BM and SB.'65 In addition,
shareholders representing five per cent or more of the stated capital of
the corporation, or shares with an aggregate par value of DM 1 million or
157 Baumbach & Hueck § 86, comment 7(B); Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 86, comment
4(d).
158 Kropff § 107, at 150. This principle must, however, be considered in connection with
AktG § 107(3), which prohibits the delegation of the more important SB functions to a
committee.
159 von Falkenhausen & Steefel, "Shareholders' Rights in German Corporations (AG
and GmbH)," 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 407, 413 (1961); see the authorities cited in note
150 supra.
160 AktG § 119(1).
161 See text accompanying notes 235-37 infra.
162 See text accompanying notes 176-79 infra.
163 AktG § 119(2).
164 The final profit of an AG is the amount which may be distributed as dividends by
the shareholders' meeting. This figure corresponds to the net profit of the fiscal year con-
cerned, plus eventual withdrawals from, and less eventual transfers to, the surplus account.
165 AktG § 120.
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more, may compel the BM to put additional items on the agenda and to
submit them to the shareholders' meeting.'66
Special meetings are called by the BM or by the SB whenever the body
concerned, in its discretion, considers such a meeting necessary for the
benefit of the corporation.'67 Shareholders representing five per cent or
more of the corporate capital may also demand the call of a special
meeting at any time.168
(2) Notice to the Shareholders. Shares of a German AG are generally
bearer shares, transferable by delivery. Thus the management of an AG
cannot directly communicate with its shareholders. Invitations to the
shareholders' meeting are not sent directly to the shareholders but are
communicated through publications in the newspapers.' 69 The publica-
tions to be used for such purposes are listed in the articles of association. 70
Invitations to the meeting, as well as any other communications which
an AG is legally required to make, must, additionally, be published in
the Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger), the official publication medium
in the Federal Republic.' 7
Most shareholders, in practice, receive their invitations to the share-
holders' meeting through the bank in which they have deposited their
shares. The BM sends a copy of the invitation with the agenda to all
the banks who, in the preceding meeting, had acted as representatives
of shareholders of the corporation. 72 The banks, in turn, must send
invitations and the agenda, without delay, to all their customers who
have entrusted shares of the corporation to them for safekeeping. 73
(3) The Conduct of a Shareholders' Meeting. A chairman, designated
by the articles of association,'74 presides at the shareholders' meeting.
In general, the chairman of the SB is also the chairman of the share-
holders' meeting. He has the right, and duty, to preserve the proper
function of the meeting, and he may exclude shareholders from the
meeting who disturb it by improper conduct. 5
Contrary to American practice, there are no quorum requirements,
unless the articles of association expressly provide for them. A duly
-166 AktG § 122(2).
167 AktG §§ 121(1)-(2), 111(3).
168 AktG § 122.
169 AktG § 121(3).
17o AktG § 23(3)6.
171 AktG § 25.
172 AktG § 125(1).
173 AktG § 128(1).
174 Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 113, comment 13; von Godin & Wilhehni, Kommentar
zum Aktiengesetz § 110, comment I (1950).
175 Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 103, comment 16; Judgment of the BGH, Nov. 11, 1965,
reported in 11 Die AG 28 (1966); Barz, Die Grosse Hauptversammlung, 7 Die AG
1, 5 (Sonderbeilage I, 1962).
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convened meeting may thus pass binding resolutions, even if only a
minority of the shares are represented therein 7 6 Generally, resolutions
are passed by a majority vote of the shares represented at the meeting. 77
The exceptions, however, overshadow the rule, since all the more im-
portant resolutions, especially the resolutions involving amendments to
the articles of association, require, in most instances, a qualified three-
fourths majority.
With regard to amendments, the articles of association may increase
the required majority and even demand a unanimous vote. 8 Clauses
in the articles of association permitting amendments by a majority of
less than seventy-five per cent are, in principle, valid. With regard to
amendments of any serious nature-as in the case of changes of the
corporate purpose, restrictions in the shareholders' preemptive rights,
capital reductions, mergers, and dissolutions-a majority of at least
seventy-five per cent is compulsory. 79
Shareholders' resolutions must be set forth in a record certified by a
judge or a notar.'80 The record must state the location and the date of
the meeting and the name of the judge or notar.'8 ' Shareholders' resolu-
tions which are not certified in this way are void.18 After the meeting
the BM must file a certified copy of such record with the Commercial
Register. 83
(4) The Shareholders' Right To Vote. In principle, each share confers
the right to vote at the shareholders' meeting. 84 The voting power of one
share is determined by its par value.'85 Neither treasury shares nor shares
directly or indirectly owned by an enterprise which is under the control
of the corporation have any voting rights. 8 ' The articles of association
may create shares without voting rights only in the case of preferred
shares. 87 The articles of association, however, may limit the voting
power of any shareholder to a specified number of shares.'8 s Contracts
between shareholders to vote in a certain way are valid, 89 but, contrary
176 Baumbach & Hueck § 113, comment 2; Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 113, comment 7.
177 AktG § 133(1).
178 Baumbach & Hueck § 113, comment 3(A); Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 113,
comments 5, 6.
179 von Falkenhausen & Steefel, supra note 159, at 414.
180 For a definition of "notar," see note 18 supra.
181 AktG § 130.
182 AktG § 241.
183 AktG § 130(4).
184 AktG § 12(1).
185 AktG § 134(1).
186 AktG § 136(2).
187 AktG § 12(1).
188 AktG § 134(1).
189 Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 114, comment 43. This does not apply to contracts
obligating a shareholder to exercise his voting rights according to instructions by the SB or
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to the American rule," 0 contracts of this kind cannot be specifically en-
forced. The party injured by a breach of such contract is relegated to
a claim for damages.191
Generally, shares with multiple voting rights are prohibited. They may
be issued only with governmental permission, and only to the extent
necessary to safeguard vital interests of the general economy.192 The
public authority responsible for the granting of multiple voting rights
is the government of the state in which the corporation has its domicile.
Voting rights can be exercised in person or by proxy. The proxy must
be in writing and signed by the shareholder concerned. 9 3 The most
important proxy holders in shareholders' meetings are banks. As in the
United States, only a minority of the shareholders personally attend the
meetings of their corporations. Most of the shareholders in Germany
leave their representation at the meeting to the banks with which their
shares are deposited. It is customary for a shareholder to give his bank
every year a written power of attorney authorizing the bank to represent
him at the shareholders' meeting of any corporation which is (or will be)
represented in his portfolio. In order to prevent abuses of this power of
attorney, the new statute subjects banks who make use of their customers'
voting power to strict and rather detailed regulations. Proxies are re-
vocable at any time and may not be granted for a longer period than
fifteen months.9 4 However, renewals are permitted and are usually
granted as a matter of course. Even with this power of attorney, a bank
is not automatically entitled to vote the shares of its principal. First,
it must submit to the customer a specific proposal as to the way it intends
to exercise the voting right and ask him for specific instructions as to
all the items on the agenda. The customer's instructions must be followed.
If the customer fails to give instructions, the bank may vote his shares
according to the proposal submitted." 5
(5) Rights of Opponents to Management at the Shareholders' Meeting.
It has already been pointed out that the widespread use of bearer shares
in German corporate practice makes direct communication from the
management of an AG to its shareholders virtually impossible. The same
difficulty, of course, exists for shareholders who want to get in touch
the BM. Such contracts are void and have no binding effect whatsoever. AktG § 136(3).
See Kropff § 136, at 201.
190 See Henn, supra note 143, §§ 200, 267.
191 Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 114, comment 43; Edman, "Zwangsweise Durchsetzung
von Ansprtichen aus einem Stimmbindungsvertrag im Aktienrecht," 4 Die AG 267, 300
(1959) ; 119 RGZ 386 (1928); Eckert, supra note 151, at 33.
192 AktG § 12(2).
L93 AktG § 134(3); BGB § 126(1).
194 AktG § 135(2).
195 AktG § 128(2).
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with their fellow-shareholders on corporate matters. The statute over-
comes this difficulty by compelling the banks to act as messengers.
Shareholders who disagree with the propositions of management may
submit, within a week after the invitation to the shareholders' meeting
is published, their counterproposals to the main office of the corporation.
The BM must communicate such proposals to the banks in the same
manner as the invitations to the shareholders' meetings. 96 The banks
in turn are bound to send these counterproposals to their customers.'97
This rule has been modeled after the "proposal rule" of the American
Securities and Exchange Commission. 98 There are thus quite a few
similarities. The counterproposal may not consist of more than one hun-
dred words,'99 and counterproposals which are intended to harass the
corporation or which have no chance whatever of adoption by the
shareholders need not be communicated to banks and bank customers
at all.20 However, contrary to the American "proposal rule," the German
rule can be invoked to propose an opposition slate of SB candidates.20 '
Another difference between the German and the American rule is that
German shareholders can utilize this procedure without incurring any
financial risk. The expenses are borne exclusively by the banks and the
corporation. °2
(6) Defective Shareholders' Resolutions. Shareholders' resolutions
which are legally defective may be either void (nichtig) or voidable
(anfechtbar). A void shareholders' resolution has no legal significance,
and its invalidity can be asserted by any one and at any time. A voidable
shareholders' resolution is, on the other hand, to be considered as valid
as long as it has not been annulled in a special "contesting action"
(Anfechtungsklage).
(a) Void Shareholders' Resolutions. In order to protect the corpora-
tion and the general public (who rely on the validity of resolutions duly
passed and filed with the Commercial Register), shareholders' resolutions
are void only in exceptional circumstances. Examples of such circum-
stances are (1) the lack of proper recording, (2) the lack of proper
196 AktG §§ 125(1), 126(1).
197 AktG § 128(1).
198 SEC Rule X-14A-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1964).
199 AktG § 126(2).
200 Ibid.
201 AktG § 127.
202 AktG § 128(6). The "right" of banks to vote the shares of customers has been one
of the most disputed subjects in connection with the enactment of the new statute. For
thorough studies of the problems connected with the "Despotstimmrecht," see Consbruch,
"Das Neue Aktiengesetz und die Kreditinstitute," 18 Zeitschrift fUr das gesamte Kreditwesen
1155 (1965); Vallenthin, "Die Neuregelung des Bankenstimmrechts im Aktiengesetz von
1965," [1965] Bankbetrieb 242; von Falkenhausen, "Das Bankenstimmrecht im neuen
Aktienrecht," 11 Die AG 69 (1966).
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notice to the shareholders in connection with the call of the shareholders'
meeting, (3) the incompatibility of the resolution with basic principles
of the legal concept of a stock corporation, (4) the violation of laws
enacted exclusively or predominantly for the protection of creditors or
the public, and (5) the violation of basic concepts of good morals.2 '
The invalidation of a shareholders' resolution for any of the reasons
stated can be asserted by bringing an action for a declaratory judgment.
An action of this kind can be brought, not only by shareholders of the
corporation or by members of its BM or SB, but also by any person
who has a legitimate interest in ascertaining the validity or invalidity
of the resolution.20 4
In certain instances private litigants are barred from asserting the
invalidity of a shareholders' resolution, if this resolution has, by over-
sight of the registration court, been entered in the Commercial Register,
and has remained unchallenged for three years after the registration. The
registration court may, however, always correct its mistake and strike
the void shareholders' resolution from its records.20 5
(b) Voidable Shareholders' Resolutions. Any other violation of a
statute or of a provision in the articles of association renders a share-
holders' resolution voidable only. Resolutions of this kind become un-
assailable and binding on the corporation unless a contesting action is
brought against the corporation within a month after the resolution is
passed. 6 Contesting actions can be brought by shareholders as well as
by the BM. Individual members of the BM and the SB may bring such
an action only if compliance with the resolution concerned would make
the plaintiff or other members of the BM or the SB criminally or civilly
liable.20 7
In order to prevent a multiplicity of suits, the statute provides that
a contesting action can be brought only at the Landgericht (the highest
court with original jurisdiction in civil cases) which has jurisdiction over
the corporation at its domicile; that, where several contesting actions are
brought against the same resolution, these actions must be joined for
simultaneous hearing and decision; and that the court may not commence
the trial of a contesting action until after the one-month period for
bringing such an action has elapsed °.20 There can thus be only one court
decision with regard to all of the contesting actions instituted against a
203 See AktG § 241.
204 Baumbach & Hueck § 201, comment 1; Schilling § 201, comment 1.
205 AktG §§ 242(2)-(3).
206 AktG § 246.
207 AktG § 245.
208 AktG § 246(3).
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particular shareholders' resolution. If the court dismisses the action
the resolution becomes unassailable, since the one-month period within
which contesting actions can be brought will have expired at the time of
judgment. A judgment for the plaintiff retroactively destroys the resolu-
tion, which is then considered as having been void from the beginning.209
Under the old statute contesting actions were prohibitively expensive.
The new statute gives the courts a wide discretion to determine court
costs and counsel's fees such that they will have a reasonable relationship
with the economic circumstances of the plaintiff.210
(c) Duties of the Majority Shareholders to the Minority in Connection
With the Exercise of Voting Power. Shareholders' resolutions may be
subject to a contesting action even though, by their terms, they do not
violate any statute or any provision of the articles of association. Thus
a contesting action may be brought against any resolution which tends
to grant special advantages to any shareholder or to third persons, or is
detrimental to the corporation or the other shareholders. The plaintiff
in this case must, however, allege and prove that one or more shareholders
have deliberately exercised their voting rights in order to achieve such
special advantages for themselves or for others. Resolutions of this kind
are safe from attack if they grant the unfavored shareholders "equitable
compensation" for their injury. 1
This rule grants minority shareholders a certain amount of protection
from the abusive exercise of majority voting power. However, it cannot
be compared with the concept of fiduciary duties under American law,
which has grown out of the general principles of trust law. The German
rule, on the other hand, has its basis in the law of torts.212 Many prin-
ciples of trust law which were used by American judges to implement the
fiduciary duties of majority shareholders have thus not entered into the
interpretation of the German rule. German majority shareholders are thus
free from limitations arising out of the law of trusts, such as the various
safeguards against self-dealing or the prohibition against the purchase
of corporate property.213 The German rule, as it is presently interpreted
209 Baumbach & Hueck § 200, comment 2(B); Schilling § 200, comment 4.
210 AktG § 247; see Kropff § 247, at 334.
211 AktG § 243(2).
212 According to German tort law, any person who intentionally injures another person
by acting contrary to recognized principles of good morals, is liable to that person in
damages. BGB § 826. Contracts which by their express terms violate such principles of
good morals are void. BGB § 138. These rules were the basis upon which German courts
developed a considerable body of case law for the protection of minority shareholders. The
Aktiengesetz of 1937 distilled some general principles out of this case law and incorporated
them in the statute. AktG 37 §§ 101, 197(2). These rules, with some additional refinements
developed by courts and commentators, were subsequently incorporated in the present
Aktiengesetz. See, e.g., Rasch, Deutsches Konzernrecht 120 (3d ed. 1966).
213 See von Falkenhausen & Steefel, "Shareholders' Rights in German Corporations (AG
and GmbH)," 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 407, 408 (1961).
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by courts and text writers, can probably be broken down into two com-
ponents: (1) shareholders' resolutions which serve the interests of the
corporation (whatever that may be) cannot be contested even if they
favor the majority to the detriment of the minority; (2) shareholders'
resolutions which favor majority shareholders and do not serve the in-
terests of the corporation are subject to contesting actions unless they
grant the minority a fair equivalent for any resulting damages. 14 It
remains to be seen whether the first component will withstand future
consideration in judicial and academic discussion.
E. Enforcement of Corporate Claims Against Members of the
BM and SB, and Majority Shareholders
It has been pointed out above that members of the BM and the SB
are liable to -the corporation for intentional or negligent violations of
their duties. Shareholders, too, may become liable to the corporation if
they abuse their influence to injure the corporation. In general terms,
any person who by use of his influence over the corporation induces a
corporate officer to act to the detriment of the corporation or its share-
holders is liable for the damages resulting therefrom.2 15
The corporation thus has ample courses of action to protect it from
mismanagement. The problem is the corporate willingness to pursue them.
Shareholders of German corporations have considerably greater prob-
lems in overcoming this difficulty than do shareholders of American
corporations, since German law does not recognize a right of individual
shareholders to inspect corporate books and records or to bring actions
on behalf of the corporation. 16
(1) Shareholders' Rights to Information and Inspection. Shareholders
attending corporate meetings are entitled to ask questions, and receive
answers thereto, to the extent necessary for obtaining an informed opinion
on the issues to be decided at the meeting.217 The BM may withhold the
desired information in exceptional circumstances only. The most im-
214 See, e.g., 33 BGHZ 175 (1960), 5 Die AG 329 (1960); Mestmlicker, Verwaltung,
Konzerngewalt und Rechte der Aktionlire 340 (1958); Rasch, supra note 212, at 122; Schilling
§ 97, comment 15(b) ; von Falkenhausen, "'Verfaussungsrechtliche Grenzen der Mehrheitsherr-
schaft im Aktienrecht," 6 Die AG 122, 123 (1961). These authorities concern specifically
the Aktiengesetz of 1937, in which the applicable provisions had a slightly different
wording. Since the changes in wording have not altered the substance of the rules, how-
ever, the old authorities should retain their vitality. See 1 Obermiler, Werner & Winden,
Aktiengesetz 1965, at 138 (1966) ; Rasch, supra note 212, at 119.
215 AktG § 117. There is no liability where the shareholder has induced the harmful
action merely by the use of his voting power. In such a case, however, the resolution is
voidable and subject to a contesting action. AktG § 243(2).
216 A right of action similar to the derivative suit in American law exists only in the
law of combined enterprises.
217 AktG § 131.
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portant of such exceptions justifying a refusal of information is the fear
of the BM that divulging the information may, in the opinion of prudent
businessmen, cause considerable harm to the corporation or to an enter-
prise connected therewith.2 1 The courts will probably tend to a narrow
interpretation of this rule.2 19 Shareholders may enforce their right to
information by a special proceeding,220 or by bringing a contesting action
against resolutions the contents of which might have been affected by
the denial of the information.
221
Shareholders suspecting mismanagement or improper practices may
ask the shareholders' meeting for the appointment of special auditors
(Sonderpriifer) in order to conduct an investigation. Officers who would
be personally involved in the investigation may not vote their shares in
connection with this resolution.22 If the request is denied at the share-
holders' meeting, shareholders representing ten per cent or more of the
corporate capital, or shares with an aggregate par value of DM 2 million
or more may make the same application to the competent court. The
application must be granted when the petitioners allege acts of misman-
agement involving grave violations of fiduciary duties, or of the statute
or the articles of association. The applicants must prove to the satisfac-
tion of the court that they were shareholders of the corporation for at
least three months prior to the shareholders' meeting concerned. 2 The
auditors must make a written report on the results of their investigation.
The report is filed with the registration court at the domicile of the
corporation where it can be studied by any interested person.224 Further-
more, the BM is bound to furnish copies of the report to any shareholder
on demand.225
Shareholders have no right to inspect the plant or other physical assets
of the corporation.2 Many corporations, however, consider it good public
relations to show their shareholders around and to make them -thereby
more familiar with their work and their products.
(2) Shareholders' Rights of Action. Contrary to the American law,227
218 AktG § 131(3)1.
219 See Judgment of the BGH, Nov. 23, 1961, reported in 7 Die AG 51 (1962), 15 Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 104 (1962) ; Judgment of the BGH, April 7, 1960, reported in 5
Die AG 195 (1960); Decision of the Landgericht in Mainz, July 1, 1966, published in 11
Die AG 327 (1966), discussed in text accompanying note 111 supra.
220 AktG § 132.
221 AktG § 243(4).
222 AktG § 142(1).
223 AktG § 142(2).
224 See HGB § 9(1) ; Kropff § 145, at 212.
225 AktG § 145(4).
226 Decision of the Landgericht, Kassel, published in 6 Die AG 239 (1961); Janberg,
"Das Recht auf Betriebsbesichtigung," 10 Die AG 1 (1965).
227 See generally Henn, Corporations and Other Business Enterprises §§ 352-83 (1961).
1967]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
shareholders, in general, have no right to sue in behalf of their corpora-
tions. 228 The enforcement of corporate claims is within the competence
of the shareholders' meeting only. This body decides by majority vote
whether claims of this kind are to be pressed or not.229 Persons against
whom the proposed action is to be directed may not vote their shares.23
Shareholders representing ten per cent or more of the corporate capital
may compel the corporation to enforce a claim, even if the shareholders'
meeting has decided against it. This right exists, however, only in favor of
shareholders who can show that they acquired their shares at least three
months prior to the shareholders' meeting concerned. 3 ' Upon application
of the ten-per-cent minority, the court may appoint special guardians to
bring the action. 32 In general, the minority shareholders have no power
to supervise or remove the guardians. This is the prerogative of the court
which appointed them.233 The guardians have access to all the corporate
records which they consider necessary for a successful prosecution of
the action.3 4
(3) Waiver and Settlement of Corporate Claims. An indispensable
item on the agenda of a regular shareholders' meeting is the approval
(or disapproval) of management by the BM and SB for the preceding
fiscal year.235 The vote is taken after the annual report and the financial
statements (balance sheet and profit-and-loss statement) have been ex-
plained to and discussed by the meeting. A vote of confidence (Entlastung)
for the BM and SB does not operate as a waiver by the corporation of
eventual damage claims for mismanagement. It merely operates as a
general approval of the business policy which in no way impedes the
right of the corporation to press damage claims at a later date.236 The
only exception to this rule is a vote of confidence assented to by all the
shareholders of the corporation. In such case the corporation is estopped
from asserting damage claims which were known to the shareholders
when the vote of confidence was passed.237
The corporation may waive or settle damage claims against members
of the SB and the BM, as well as damage claims against shareholders
228 See text accompanying note 216 supra.
229 AktG § 147(1).
230 AktG § 136(1).
231 AktG § 147(1).
232 AktG § 147(3).
233 von Godin & Wilhelmi, Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz § 122, comment 8 (1950).
234 83 RGZ 248 (1913).
235 AktG § 120(1).
236 AktG § 120(2); see Kropff § 135, at 197; 1 Obermiiller, Werner & Winden, supra note
214, at 72.
237 judgment of the BGH, March 12, 1959, published in 4 Die AG 225 (1959).
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and third persons, only after a three years' waiting period. This waiting
period need not be complied with if the obligor of the damage claim
is insolvent and enters into a composition with his creditors in order to
avoid or terminate bankruptcy proceedings. Any waiver or settlement
requires 'the consent of the shareholders' meeting which, in turn, can be
blocked by the veto of shareholders holding ten per cent or more of the
corporate capital.3 8
Corporate resolutions for the vote of confidence, as well as for a
waiver and settlement of corporate claims, must be adopted by a disin-
terested majority. Persons to be benefited by such resolutions may not
vote their shares.239
F. Foreign Aspects
It is not required that shareholders or members of the BM or SB be
citizens or even residents of Germany. 40 Members of the BM, of course,
must live reasonably close to the place of the corporate business if they
want to discharge properly their duties toward the corporation. But
nationality and residence in no way affect the duties of the SB and the
BM members to their corporation. The same is true as to corporate
damage claims against shareholders who have participated in acts of
mismanagement or who have exercised an improper influence upon cor-
porate officers. According to the German conflict-of-laws rule, all those
matters are exclusively governed by the law of the domicile of the corpo-
ration, which, in case of a German AG, is always German law.241
The statute does not indicate whether shareholders' meetings may take
place outside Germany. The weight of authority answers this question in
the negative. 42 The theory is that shareholders would be unduly harassed
if they were forced to go abroad to attend a meeting of their corporation.
This reasoning does not apply to cases where all the shareholders consent
to a foreign meeting place.24 3 In the case of a corporation which is a sub-
sidiary of a foreign corporation or which is completely owned by foreign
shareholders, the best interest of all shareholders might be served by
holding the meeting outside of Germany.
Since the meetings have -to be recorded in a formal instrument certified
238 AktG §§ 93(4), 116, 117(4).
239 AktG § 136(1).
240 Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 75, comment 7.
241 Kegel, Internationales Privatrecht 207 (2d ed. 1964); Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 5,
comment 7.
242 Baumbach & Hueck § 105, comment 4; Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 105, comment
10; von Godin & Wilhelmi, supra note 224, § 10s, comment 7.
243 Schmidt & Meyer-Landrut § 105, comment 10.
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by a judge or a notar,244 a meeting held in the United States would have
to be certified by a German Consul qualified by the German Consular
Laws to exercise judicial functions abroad or, perhaps, by an admitted
German attorney abroad provided his qualifications are equivalent to a
German notar and the "notarial" formalities are followed.
244 See note 18 supra.
